No. 45 — "Die Welt" — Page 3
Do the gentlemen movers believe that such situations, such points of contact between the several departments, will wait until the gentlemen "heads of Dezernate come together once a quarter?
But is it really necessary first to prove the harmfulness of a decentralisation by abstract deductions? Have we not seven years of practical experience in this regard! The Congresses, which were convinced with regard to the central direction that it could consist only of persons living in one and the same place, made experiments with regard to less important bodies, to see whether it would not be well in some cases to disregard unity of place and consider only the capability of the members. Commissions for agitation and organisation, for culture and colonisation, e tutti quanti, were elected, whose members lived in different cities. Now, has even one of these commissions achieved the least thing?
And lastly the National Fund Commission, for whose composition out of jurists of various countries there was even an inner reason, namely the knowledge of the laws of the respective countries?
In December 1901 the National Fund Commission was elected for the purpose of securing the legalisation of the National Fund, and today, after some three years, the National Fund is still not legalised. At the same time it must be acknowledged that the members of the commission had a good will to work and did perform work. The president and two members of the commission worked out independent drafts; likewise the Inner A.C. submitted a draft of its own. The commission met four times — and in spite of this, this lamentable result! Who is to blame? Not the members of the commission, but their separation in place. Had the commission had its seat in one place, it would have held more deliberations in a week than otherwise in three years, and would have finished its work within a month. Made wise by these experiences, the Congress has latterly broken with the system of commissions without unity of place, and has elected the Palestine Commission from members who live in the same place. And that is also the first commission that is achieving something highly profitable.
In a naïvely unconscious way Messrs. Klee and Hantke themselves pronounce judgment on their motion in their statement of reasons. They say:
"In these proposals we start, in the first place, from the view that this is not the time to carry out a ... sweeping amendment of the Organisation Statute. Rather, the old must be preserved so far as is at all possible, and reforms not indispensably necessary must be deferred. Only so will it be possible to avoid ruinous shocks." Accordingly they confine themselves solely to § 23. Solely to § 23! Let one read all the other paragraphs of the Statute and one will find that, with the exception of the first two paragraphs, which contain programmatic provisions, all the others regulate almost nothing but details, of which it is for the most part indifferent whether they read thus or otherwise.
It is not of such great moment whether the Congress takes place every year or every two years, whether the shekel amounts to 40 or 50 kopecks, whether the elections are direct and secret or indirect and open, whether one is entitled to vote or be elected at 18 or at 20 years, whether 100 or 200 shekel-payers elect one delegate, whether the Court of Arbitration is composed thus or otherwise, etc., etc. These are mere details, which do not much affect the strength and cohesion of the Organisation. On the other hand, precisely § 23, which contains the provision on the direction of the Organisation, is positively the most important, because it gives the Organisation its head.
Only an amendment of this paragraph in the sense desired by the movers could be described as "sweeping." For the gentlemen move nothing else than to cut off the head of the Organisation! And there can hardly be a more sweeping amendment than that.
Now, since the gentlemen themselves say that a sweeping amendment would bring about ruinous shocks, they thereby pronounce judgment on their own motion. Were it adopted, our Organisation could be compared — the earlier example is the most fitting — to a hay-wagon harnessed to nine oxen (not Arab horses, for we have not so many geniuses), which, with the best will to draw it into the barn, succeed only in tearing it apart.
We believe that it is at all events better for the Organisation to have a head, even if not one of genius, than to be headless.
And last not least the following consideration as well: as is well known, the organisation of our Bank is closely bound up with our movement. The Bank stands under the supervision of the Congress. The Congress exercises this through the members of the A.C. elected by it, who form the Board of Supervision of the Bank. This is regulated as follows: in the Bank's statute the first Board of Supervision, consisting of members of the A.C., is named individually, and it is laid down that on withdrawals the remaining members supplement themselves by election. Besides this, the first members of the Board of Supervision concluded among themselves an agreement (trust deed) to the effect that those of them who withdraw from the A.C. also cease to be members of the Board and co-holders of the Fonder Shares, and that vacancies can be filled only by the admission of members of the A.C. Now, according to the motions before us, either the (Greater) A.C. is to be abolished altogether and "the Great Council" put in its place (I. W. Marmorek), or the name of the body is indeed to be retained but a different content given to it. If there is now no A.C., or none in the sense of the agreements made at the time (and on the adoption of one proposal or the other the question will at the least be disputable), then there is also no Board of Supervision of the Bank; and if the Bank has no Board of Supervision, it cannot legally continue to exist and must go into liquidation!
These motions positively reduce themselves ad absurdum with the provision that the President of the Bank's Board of Directors is to have seat and vote in the A.C., the supervisory authority of the Bank. Surely the only bank director who can become his own Board of Supervision! Do the gentlemen movers believe that a so disant A.C., in which a director of the "Jewish Colonial Trust" has seat and vote, can be regarded as the same A.C. from which, according to the agreements made at the time, the Board of Supervision of that same Trust is to be formed? Do they believe that an