No. 43. — "Die Welt" — Page 7.
(continued from page 6)
…hear the full truth as to what the Jewish supreme general staff has upon its conscience.
What they hate in Zionism is not the eventual departure of their milch-cow to Palestine, for they rely far too much upon their nameless and numberless intrigues to frustrate the movement. No! What causes their horror and opens the valves of their bile-ducts is the transformation into genuine Jews of the flocks which they have systematically Christianized, but which are now left to run wild.
No! Jewish blood Zionism may perhaps one day have to take upon itself, but even then with pride, for it will be the blood of heroes; whereas the little red ribbons of the Legion of Honour which these thirty years have adorned the buttonholes of our Jewish chieftains — that is the blood of others, that is Jewish martyr-blood!
That it must one day come to this polemic we knew long since, and we have guarded ourselves against every provocation, because we saw the attacks already coming. But with hypocritical opponents no peace is to be hoped for — nor to be desired either. Such men must be driven energetically into the Christianity for which they long; otherwise they have violence and malice enough to set all the ignorant upon us, and if we let them have their way they will — as indeed they are already trying to do — handle the blood-accusation a thousand times more adroitly and more successfully than the antisemites have done these centuries past. The remnant of Judaism that slumbered in them is already dead; but what they have acquired from their crossing with full-blooded Jesuits, that blazes and flickers up in their breast, and therewith they hope to scorch us. But we have on our side the word of truth and of brotherly Judaism, and so, in their despite, we shall bring to the French and Algerian Jews — the unhoped-for deliverance.
Lazarus' Ethics of Judaism.
By B. Jacobs.
Jewish ethics bears from the outset a theological stamp. As the whole Jewish view of the world cannot be conceived without God, so the Jewish spirit gives to morality a theistic foundation. Morally good and pleasing to God, moral law and divine ordinance, are inseparable conceptions; they are, however, by no means identical. It is not through the divine command that the moral becomes law; rather, because it must become law even without a command — because, to speak with Kant, it is autonomous — was it commanded by God. The principle of the Jewish doctrine of morals is God as the primal source and the pattern of the idea of the good, as the personified and realized, or rather as the real idea of morality itself. In other words, the moral law is founded upon the essence of morality, and hence upon the categorical imperative. That this is so appears also from the utterance frequently recurring in rabbinical literature, that every law should be fulfilled lischmoh, that is to say, in its name — in the name, therefore, of the law, for the sake of the dignity, the majesty, and the unconditionally obligatory force of the law. And in order to banish the faintest doubt that morality shines forth in Judaism as an end in itself, Lazarus adds: "The in any case indubitable sense of this conception of lischmoh is further confirmed by the fact that the Rabbis in many cases regard it as a pedagogic means, and therefore as permissible, to practise the good for the sake of some other end — for example, to pursue the study of science out of ambition, because in so doing one will come to love study and will then pursue it for its own sake."
As the ultimate and highest motive of all activity, morality masters all other ends which man strives after; it takes them in tow, it embraces and encompasses them, gives them their regulating measure, and with the barrier gives also support, quickening and elevation. The moral nature of man is the consummation of all natural existence, and the crown of all spiritual activity is the creation of morality; all spiritual efficacy, all investigation and knowledge, all mastery of nature, all creation of culture and free shaping of art, issues in the spirit of morality, which is the most perfect idea. Thus the Rabbis of the school of Rabbi Janai remark upon the assertion of Koheleth, that there is nothing new under the sun: "Under the sun there is not, but above it there is." Lazarus gives to these lapidary words the doubtless correct interpretation, that in the course of nature one can never regard a phenomenon, even though it was not given in earlier experience, as a really new one, since every natural phenomenon is grounded in the materials of nature and in her laws of formation and of motion. Only the phenomena of moral-spiritual existence, the ethical disposition and form of life, stand over against the total picture of the physical universe; with their peculiar laws, differing from all others, and directed not upon natural necessity but rather upon inward freedom, they constitute a truly new thing. All that lives and moves under the sun must bow and submit to the law of nature; one may, through knowledge and inventive combination, place that law in the service of freely chosen ends; but the law itself can neither be altered nor multiplied nor extended. But beyond all nature, and above even her most exalted forms of existence, "above the sun," there appears the moral world-order with its laws, whose origin and whose goal are given in themselves. That this is really the sense of that rabbinical remark appears from the fact that the conception of the moral world as a creative completion of the natural is to be met with among the Rabbis in manifold turns of expression. Among others it is said: "He who accomplishes a moral deed — as, for example, the judge who pronounces a just sentence — becomes God's fellow in the creation of the world." The thought which Kant expresses in the words: "If justice perishes, it is no longer of any worth that men should live upon the earth," meets us among the Rabbis in the allegory: "God held Mount Sinai over the congregation of Israel like a bowl or a basket and said: if they accept the law, then it is well; if not, then let them find their grave here"; or in the variant: "God at the creation of the world made a compact with the powers of nature: if the children of Israel accept the law, then shall ye continue; if not, then shall chaos return."
Like all that is lofty and noble in the human spirit, the fulfilment of duty as such can be attained and acquired only with difficulty and slowly. If kant designates the advance in the reverence for the law as a "holy awe which transforms itself into love," so rabbinical literature knows a development from the observance of the law out of "reverence" to that out of "love." The love of the morally good alone is the ethics of life; all else is a secondary matter, is subordinate; it belongs to the technique of life.
This lofty ideal view is not in the least impaired by the fact that the Thora threatens the transgression of the commandments with punishment and promises reward to those who fulfil them. The threatening of punishments and the promise of reward are, as Lazarus very rightly distinguishes, everywhere only psychological means for securing the fulfilment of the laws, but not the grounds of the law. He expresses himself very acutely: "If to-day the State punishes theft, has it any sense to say that the punishment of the thief is the ground of the law? Does the State teach or demand or ordain the avoidance of punishment? And not rather lawful conduct towards one's neighbour and his property? Upon many of the publicly posted tablets of the modern State one finds: this and that 'is forbidden under a penalty of 5 marks'; it does not there say that decency, or right, or anything else of the sort forbids the thing; can one on that account say: punishment is the principle of the law?" The biblical language does indeed at times accommodate itself to the simple, plain, childlike consciousness of the people, which, following the general mainspring of nature, strives after the agreeable and the prosperous and shuns suffering and what is hurtful, and it gives room to the theory of retribution. "But," says Lazarus very delicately, "not only is the proper ground of the law not contained in reward and punishment, but they are not even set up as the proper motive of the will. 'Honour father and mother, that it may be well with thee and that thou mayest live long' can never and in no wise have the sense: thou shalt live long, therefore shalt thou honour father and mother; but rather: thou desirest (by nature) to live long: that thou wilt attain if thou honourest father and mother. The reward is known, as it were, as a fact of experience, as a natural result; but it is not conceived as a motive, least of all as the sole or proper motive." In Rabbinism the references to reward and punishment are in many ways turned to account as pedagogic means, in order to educate men by degrees to purity, sincerity and freedom of the will. Beside these, however, numerous utterances are to be recorded which apprehend from such a means dangers to the true, selfless ethical standpoint, and would therefore have it dispensed with. But not only utilitarianism, but also the eudaemonism which dominates most ethical systems, and which morality in the inward satisfaction produced by it, in the