Die Welt · Vol. III, No. 23 · 9 June 1899
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Page 2 — "Die ✡ Welt" — No. 23

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…such widenings formerly carried within them for the most part a surrender of what was Jewish, because they were bound to turn precisely against the narrowness of Jewish life, now Jewish life widens itself in that it gives to the heroic and the expansive the possibility of unfolding wholly within Jewry. Even in the aesthetic salons of the richest great Jews, Jewish travellers in Asia, young Jews who amid the greatest bodily hardships were carrying culture as colonists into Palestine, would need to cut no less stately a figure than English or German travellers in Africa. But above all, there might now be enacted wholly within Jewish life that moving and enrapturing scene of the Renaissance poet, in which a Jewish youth might say of a Jewess: She loved me for that which I had done.

The Revision.

The most gripping novel that the nineteenth century has brought forth is drawing to its close. It is a good, reconciling end, such as in more naïve times narrators of the old school were wont respectably to contrive. Innocence comes, after long and right bitter sufferings, into the light of the suns. Virtue receives a wreath of light flowers pressed upon its blood-streaming brow. Vice is punished, in so far as it is not already preserved from ensuing unpleasantnesses by a legally valid judgment in the same matter, by a statute of limitations, or by some other salutary chicane of the law. And in the cell of Dreyfus and Picquart, du Paty de Clam is now delivered over to his pangs of conscience. Whom did a little shudder not run over at this news of so complete a reversal of destiny? There is, then, a retribution here below. Evil cannot in the long run remain victorious. The day of justice comes because it must come, because a society which can no longer distinguish right from wrong would have to perish of its own infamy as of a shameful disease. With a happy breath of relief we leave the all too violently gripping novel which has so often terrified and tortured us. The last chapter compensates us for much; it is fair, bright and free, and it grants a prospect into a humanity that can purify itself if only it earnestly will.

But it was no dream woven by a poet's hand about our affrighted souls. Reality it was. For five years it could lie upon France like an ill-smelling fog, like a vapour that rises from a herded-together multitude and then, poisoning, sinks down upon it again. And that is what makes us reflect once more, as we look back upon this closed chapter in the history of the great country which we all loved so long as it was a land of noble thoughts, of philanthropic endeavours, so long as it was the glorious testing-ground of all good freedoms. Will it become that once more? That is the question which strongly moves us to-day. Why should it move us also, distant onlookers that we are? Is it not merely the heavy fate of a single man, resolved at last in serene calm — the fate perhaps of a family, or even of a party group, but at most of this foreign land? No, more was at stake in that grim quarrel. It was indeed from the outset a single misfortune; but it has grown, it has spread abroad, it has beaten over the borders of the one country and has become an oppressive concern of civilised mankind. And we, who lived through this ghastly occurrence stroke by stroke, perhaps render ourselves no account as yet of how much of the condition of our present civilisation will hereafter be discerned from it.

An innocent man, previously of unblemished repute, is torn with one jerk out of his calling and his family. He is a blameless soldier, honour-loving, industrious, conscientious. But precisely thereby he has aroused envy and vexation in some of his comrades. Perhaps, in the consciousness of duty fulfilled, he was a little too brusque, too self-righteous. He becomes disliked. Because he does not please this comrade or that, ill-will seeks a ground for the preconceived judgment. Before the chose jugée there was a prejudice, and this men wished to see executed. An unjust judgment is indeed an evil thing; but what is even the most unjust and most preposterous sentence beside a prejudice? Here we are already at the core of the Dreyfus case, whereby the figure of the poor captain has doubtless grown into the history of this age. Here we must begin if we would understand what is so appalling in this affair. Error of law and the persecution of the innocent are doubtless for ever inseparable from human insufficiency. The very language of the law says so with secret candour and foreboding remorse when it declares that the right is sought, that a judgment is drawn from the best knowledge and conscience. In the finding of law there is chance also, and this the wiser judge never conceals from himself. That the legislator has made himself familiar with the shattering possibility of guiltless condemnations he proves plainly enough by the modern measures of compensation which are granted to such sufferers. Error we must take into the bargain, since we desire that judges shall be men to whom nothing human may be alien.

And we may believe that from every seat of judgment the lost cries of innocent men go up. Unbridled Judge Lynch in the Wild West may be guilty of this quite as well as a rigid bench among the calcified paragraphs of a penal code that life has outrun. But the cry which was to be stifled in the secret chamber of the French court-martial, and which nevertheless, as by a miracle, forced its way out and grew so mighty that a trembling from it went through the world — that was a peculiar cry. It was wrung forth not so much by the unjust judgment as by the prejudice.

Yes indeed, it was an unhappy man who suffered upon Devil's Island. But how many unhappy men suffer. Life is full of dramas in which the good and the guiltless must endure much affliction. A judgment and a punishment are often not the worst of things. There are more torments in many an ordinary existence than in the torture-chambers of ingenious Spain in the Middle Ages. Banishment to a desert island is by no means the cruellest thing our imagination is able to conceive. And had the sufferer died upon that distant islet, his fate would still not have reached its end with his death. For his case had from the very first, so to speak, stripped off the corporeal. It had become an abstract occurrence.

Once again one would do the degraded captain Alfred Dreyfus a strange injustice were one to conceive of him as a tragic hero or a martyr. For he did not fight for an idea and suffered for no conviction. Seen through his own eyes, the adventure has been merely a common misfortune, although in it he approved much strength of soul and a noble talent for endurance. It cannot even be said with certainty that he would have taken the side of the persecuted man had such a thing befallen another under otherwise identical conditions. People who had known him before were wont