copy. It is difficult to understand why former Secretaries of State considered the Turkish text final authority. It is well known that treaties were written at that time in French and translations made thereof for the contracting parties. Knowing this, the English copy should have been given as much value as the Turkish copy.
It remained for Secretary Frelinghuysen to set this matter aright. He commissioned twenty eminent scholars, each to make a translation from the original Turkish text. Every one of these translations contained clauses almost similar to those which the Porte declared were not there at all; that is, in substance stipulating that no American citizen shall be confined in a Turkish prison, but shall be punished for his crime by his minister or consul. In a note to Tevfik Pasha, May 30, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen said, in substance: “The simple question is, what did the treaty of 1830 stipulate for American citizens in Turkey at that time. You will recall without difficulty the many occasions on which this Government has asked of Turkey an intelligible paraphrase of the disputed article, and to explain what was the usage for other Franks in 1830. Not the slightest attempt to enlighten this Government on those two all-important points has been made. The treaty was negotiated, as you are aware, in the French tongue. If under these circumstances, the effect of translation was to occasion differences between two texts, it would seem to be due to translation from French into Turkish. . . Omit these words [those claimed to have been omitted by the Turkish government] and the remaining text becomes utterly meaningless. Nothing whatever is stipulated save the usage observed towards other Franks.... The stipulation was meant to rest on a solid basis, not on a delusive quicksand, shifting with each varying provision of Turkish law. This is evident when we remember that in 1830 there were no tribunals to which foreigners were amenable . . . . .”
By abrogating the Treaty of 1862 and simultaneously insisting on errors in the Treaty of 1830, the Porte had three objects in view:
1st. To dispute the right of American consular jurisdiction over American citizens in Turkey. 2nd. To levy an ad valorem duty on American goods and put them at a disadvantage in competition with other foreign merchants. 3rd. To repudiate the expatriation theory of the United States and to uphold the doctrine of permanent allegiance to the Sultan.
The Turkish government promulgated the law of nationality January 19th, 1869. Article V of that law reads: “An Ottoman subject acquiring a foreign nationality with the sanction of the Imperial government, will be considered and treated as a foreign subject. If. on the contrary, he has obtained foreign naturalization without the previous authorization of the Imperial government, such naturalization will be considered null and void, and he will be regarded and treated in every respect as an Ottoman subject,” etc.
The Porte claims that under this law it can discriminate between naturalized and native American citizens, and treat as Turkish subjects those Turks who, without previous consent of the Ottoman government, have become naturalized in the United States since 1869.
In answer to this contention, Mr. Bayard, in his instructions to Mr. Cox, minister to Turkey, November 28, 1885, wrote: “This Government has never admitted and cannot now admit the doctrine for which the Porte contends. Within our domestic jurisdiction, we are bound to uphold and enforce the right of expatriation. . . Turkey can no more expect us to renounce our fundamental doctrine in respect to our citizens within her territory than she could expect to enforce her doctrine within the United States by preventing the naturalization here of a Turk who emigrates without the authorization of an Imperial iradé.” However, the Turkish government, even without a treaty to that effect, has never failed to recognize the valid naturalization of a Turk elsewhere, if the fact is proven by proper citizen papers and a passport, which are considered prima facie evidences of nationality in international law. It is a matter of history that whenever the Secretary of State has insisted on recognition of these evidences of nationality, there has been no effective opposition. The specific treaty of 1830, with “the most favored nation” clause, is sufficiently inclusive upon which to base the rights and privileges of American citizens.
Moreover, the policy of the United States has been to extend its protection to one who merely claims his domicile here, and who had declared his intention to establish himself here permanently. A declaration to that effect is presumptive evidence that such a person has abandoned his native land and withdrawn his allegiance from his former government. Especially is this so where the declaration is accompanied by an announcement of his intention to become a citizen. In the absence of treaty stipulation