THE MACCABAEAN
shape in my memory. Herzl inaugurated the meeting by a short but most interesting speech. Nordau then explained the necessity of a programme.
The chief difficulty the Commission faced was that of defining Jewish Palestinian aspirations in such a manner that the relations with the suzerain power, Turkey, should not be compromised. Loyalty towards Turkey was not a phrase of calculated diplomacy; it was a fact. Zionism never intended to undertake against Turkey, or against any other government, any sort of revolt, any campaign of agitation, adventure, political hazard or intrigue whatever. The moyens d'action in view were exclusively moral influence, press and public propaganda, financial enterprise and pioneer work. On the other hand, a Turkish charter would not afford the necessary security, and guarantees of the other great powers seemed indispensable.
The next difficulty was the question of the Judenstaat. Herzl made it quite clear that he never intended to create an independent Jewish state. I remember that he invited our amazement when he said that his idea was misrepresented from the very outset. One of the members of the Commission (if my memory does not fail me it was Dr. R. Landau) said: "But you have written that pamphlet Der Judenstaat." Herzl replied, "Yes, but people did not understand even the title of the pamphlet. I did not propose einen judischen Staat (A Jewish State), but I proposed to give the territory the name Judenstaat (Jews' State). Had I wanted a state like all other states of the world, I would have labelled it as ein judischer Staat, but I did not dream of making it like any other state. I was thinking of a Jewish territory, well protected and well organized, run by a modern company on the lines of rational and progressive colonization. Such territory I would call Judenstaat, but it was far from my mind to compete with the existing empires, kingdoms, or republics by the creation of a new sort of kingdom. All the protests against this non-existent idea are mere clap-trap. We want a Jewish Gemeinwesen (Commonwealth) with all securities for freedom. In my pamphlet I left the question open where this territory should be; but since then we have decided that this territory should be Palestine, and Palestine alone. Well, now, there is no more question about the name; it is the old land, the historic land."
Herzl's declaration made a deep impression, although several objections and doubts were raised. The conference seemed to me at its first meeting not only remarkably orderly in its proceedings, but notable as manifesting an exceptional measure of underlying unity. The "Chevove Zion" avowed themselves in full accord with the proposals of a political character, and in no fundamental disaccord with the ideas involved in the rest. All the statements made by Herzl revealed an analogous general unity of aim with diversity of expression and emphasis. The latter concerned particularly the attitude towards "philanthropy." Herzl was exceedingly bitter against every idea of coupling Zionism with any sort of charity. His experiences and disappointments with some wealthy Jews, prior to the First Congress, may have contributed greatly to this bitterness. Kleinkolonisation, to him, was identical with charity. Others more moderate on this point, did not agree with such a radical condemnation of charitable methods. But Herzl's conception was more heroic.
Still, this first meeting was not the last one, and difficulties of all sorts arose. There was not only the Commission consisting of Prof. Schapiro, Rosenberg, Landau and others; the minutes on this point contain only an official brief version. The question was dis-
cussed in several groups, although the Congress recognized formally only one "Commission." It agitated the "Russians," it stirred up the "Austrians"; for days and days the debaters floated in a sea of phraseology. On certain points the programmes generally agreed. All except a quite insignificant minority of "Choveve Zion," with Bambus at their head, were against watering down the political character of the movement. All preferred to join the new organization; there was a large demand for making it a condition that one programme must be recognized by all the sections; there was a unanimous protest against compromises with assimilants and advocacy of a homogeneous party. But opinions were divided as to the question to what extent the proposed commonwealth should form a self-governing political unit within the larger state, whether this meant only the free public use of language, religion, and communal life or also economic management, and what would be the relations of the proposed Jewish commonwealth with other nationalities of Palestine. The fact was that all the programmes had a common foundation in the formula of autonomy, the difference being only one of interpretation.
The subsequent meetings of the official Commission as well as of the numerous self-appointed commissions were exceedingly agitated and sometimes stormy. The members grew more and more controversial, dialectical, polemical. The Jewish mind began to work. The erudite, shrewd Prof. Schapiro, gifted with intellect and eloquence, and combining a national idealism and devotion with a sense for immediate practical realities, displayed on some points a radical intransigeance which made the discussion somewhat difficult, not on account of his radicalism, but on account of his vivid temper. Another member, a versatile and open-minded young scholar, insisted on basing the whole programme on the "laws of nations." Two lawyers contradicted each other vehemently with regard to these laws. Herzl wanted to cut the matter short and proposed to submit it to the Congress, although he would prefer to have it first settled in the Commission. To him the Congress was everything. "What at bottom is the prejudice against public debate? It is little more than the fear that the Gentiles may misunderstand us. That prejudice emanates from anti-Zionists. Would a public debate hurt us more than the mysteriousness of secret meetings and commissions? The case, perhaps, is more delicate as between us and the Ottoman government. But in the long run if there is a grievance or suspicion, sensible men value frank discussion, which may lead to a better understanding." In these or similar terms, according to my recollection, Herzl insisted upon bringing the whole matter before the Congress.
"For the sake of argument let us assume that this would be a better way," remarked Prof. Schapiro. "But what if the Congress cannot come to any conclusion? Do we not run the risk of a terrible failure?"
Herzl did not admit the possibility of a failure, because he firmly believed in the unerring judgment of the Congress more than in the competence of experts and in the usefulness of commissions and section. Herzl's ideal in the first years was the homogeneousness of the Congress, and he felt much disappointed when he realized that the development of the organization led—as, to my mind, it necessarily led—to differentiation. When I met him in July, 1902, in Vienna—at a period of great perturbation in internal Zionist affairs—he said to me: "Our Congress has unfortunately degenerated into a parliament with parties and whips. What I wanted was that Zionists should go to the Congress as free men, unbiased by partisan politics and resolutions passed before in