The Maccabaean · Vol. XXXII, No. 10 · December 1919
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The Maccabaean

Dissatisfaction expressed itself in two ways: (1) in condemnation of the Executive Committee for transferring its authority to the Administrative Committee; (2) against the Administrative Committee for assuming authority that should have been exercised by the Executive Committee.

Lacking other and more important material to consider and digest, also the satisfaction of knowing that the period of waiting upon the Peace Conference had come to an end, the minds of the Zionists turned with what may be called a frenzy to the remedy of organization reform. Such reforms as were advocated seemed small and futile. Had the insurgents been consistent, they should have come prepared to vote in a new administration. But they too realized that there was something under the circumstances that would make such an attempt unfair and unjust to those who had led the administration during a critical year. The convention was not free to act without prejudice or feeling; at the same time it could not act logically and consistently. All the pent-up disappointment and vexations, all the personal animosities created, poured out in a disorganized desire to provoke and irritate the administration, but not to displace it.

It could not have been otherwise. There was no legislative program. There could be no definite exposition of the status of Palestine. The administration in general lacked a policy and misunderstood the situation. Had the policy of action recommended by the Honorary President been given a hearing weeks in advance of the Convention, or had it been included in the agenda of the convention so that the delegates would have made it part of their own thinking, Palestine would have driven Organization into the last sessions of the convention. But the policy came too late; and so Palestine found itself lost among the miscellaneous resolutions that came at the fag-end of the Convention.

III

Coming to the Convention unprepared for the outbreak of dissatisfaction, the Administration was also the victim of the circumstances. It misconceived the purpose of the insurgent groups. Instead of looking at their proposals with a benevolent eye, eager to pick the good out of the chaff of the impractical, it assumed for several days that the insurgents represented Administration opposition. In vain the insurgents disclaimed that they were opponents. In vain they sought to debate their propositions and to come to some understanding. The Administration seemed to think it an essential measure of protection to condemn everything that did not have its sanction in advance, although due notice had been given in the Regional Conferences of the sincerity of those advocating reform measures. In the last moments of the Convention a change of attitude was noticed with good results.

The Administration also gave the impression that it was not willing to shift its policies from that of the methods of the war period to that of the methods of the period of peace. Probably, if it had had time to take counsel, it would not have arrived at this conclusion, but so many of the important members of the Administration had estranged themselves by absence from the Organization proper that they could not be made to realize that a new spirit had come over the Zionists. These Zionists included the best workers in the Districts, the most loyal workers and the most intelligent workers. Realizing the impossibility of the

situation that had been created during the war, they wanted to have their views reflected in the views of the leadership. They wanted the leadership to be responsible, and consciously so. They felt that unless there was a free flow of views from the constituency to the Administration and vice versa, the Organization could not hold together. They were astounded to find the Administration unwilling to listen and branding their demands as opposition.

Any Administration might be proud of the delegates that sat in Chicago from Friday afternoon until Thursday midnight. We had a body of delegates who were in earnest and had given thought to the matters in hand. They were single-minded in their views that the strengthening of the Organization and the preservation of the democratic features of the Zionist Organization were paramount matters, about which there could be no compromise. They had the courage of their convictions. Among the delegates were many who were members of the Administration staff. In the face of the Administration's disapproval, expressed with emphasis and with the authority of the highest respected personalities, they stood up and voted deliberately for the proposals they had espoused. There was no malice and no pettiness in their discussion of what they proposed should be reformed. They were willing to test the value of their opinion in open debate. And the debates at the Convention on these reformatory proposals were highly instructive and indicative of a lofty sentiment of respect for the Organization, as such, and for the Administration also. Such delegates, representing the background of Zionist membership, should impress every sober-thinking Zionist with the positive strength of the Zionist Organization.

IV

What did the Convention accomplish? Aside from the merit of the measures adopted, it may be said to have affirmed the desire of the Zionists to place the responsibility for the Zionist Administration in the authority created by the Constitution, to-wit: the Executive Committee. It showed that it wanted to have Zionist affairs conducted in a legally responsible manner, with no undue power in any section of the Administration, but with a distributed responsibility that was united in action in the Executive Committee. It strengthened the financial responsibility of the Organization, and gave reassurance to all Zionists that the democracy of the movement remains unimpaired after five years of war, and would renew its strength under conditions of peace. So that in reality the Zionists of America come out of the war practically unscathed by any of the blemishes that have crept into other organizations and other governments.

V

Having cleared the air and driven confusion out of the minds of the Zionists, the Zionist Organization of America now confronts a period when the faith of Zionists in the success of their cause will be tested. The time for discussion of academic theories has passed. All our thought is now to be devoted to arousing the Jewish people to the need of practical action for Palestine, and to such discussions as take into consideration the plans for action. The Convention was unfortunately not in a position to discuss what may be called the permanent status of Palestine. Those matters were in the hands of powers over which we have no control. We have no right to linger in argument