Die Welt · Vol. III, No. 28 · 14 July 1899
3printed page
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Facsimile · scan 7 of 20
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English · AI translation, checked against the German

No. 28. — "Die Welt" — Page 3.

(continued from page 2)

…have dropped out, Germany has entered; no displacement of aims has taken place, but merely a renewal and an intensification of the means. The lead England still holds, and there is no appearance that she will lose it so soon. In spite of all her successful competition on the world market, Germany with her sea power remains for long yet dependent upon assiduous labour before she can one day move even distantly into the second place after England. Fleets are as little stamped out of the earth as armies, and fleets are, after all, the necessary instruments of world policy. Germany is breathlessly at work to secure for herself, as her Secretary of State said in the Reichstag, her place in the sun, and thanks to the prodigious energy which the State, but still more commerce and industry, put forth, she has in a comparatively short space come appreciably forward. But that in spite of this she is still a great way behind England, upon that they certainly cherish no illusion in Berlin. Yet not even with "ape-like speed" can a development of centuries be overtaken in two decades. We lately read that the merchant marine of Hamburg exceeds that of France threefold. Well, to be sure, one can only marvel how colossally the German merchant marine has increased within a short time; but if world policy rests essentially upon this, that behind the merchant ships there stands in case of need a war fleet also, which guarantees to them protection and unhindered movement, then it remains for the present true that the English world power has as yet been attained by no other.

For the present. From this reservation one must not allow oneself to be pushed away. For the great problems of power and questions of interest do indeed change now with such rapidity that the people who thirty years ago felt the preparations for the decisive struggle between Germany and France to be fearful convulsions passing all measure of what had ever been heard of, must positively think themselves over anew in face of the expansions of to-day, by means of which the great Powers enlarge their spheres of interest to a monstrous extent. An orthodox Nietzschean would say that here too it is a matter of a transvaluation of values. But formulas are a wretched makeshift for fathoming the essence of mighty historical developments. That Russia, England, Germany, and France stand ready, at the given moment or, as the case may be, after the well-known artichoke method, to divide China among themselves; that they have no fear lest these four hundred millions of Mongols might, after they have learned the trade of war from the Europeans, roll devastatingly against everything European — therein lies, as it seems to us, a downright overpowering historical paranomy. Things stand not essentially otherwise in Africa, save that there no immemorial civilisation comes in question.

And far more interesting still is the remarkable bending which the European Eastern problem is on the point of undergoing. For a hundred years and more it was an unalterable cliché; the Oriental Powers most nearly interested were Russia, Austria, and England; in the second line stood France. The future possession of Constantinople formed the crossing-point of the conflicting interests. The influences at the Golden Horn combated one another, but it passed for unavoidable that the division of the inheritance of the "sick man" was only a question of a comparatively short term. The Emperor Nicholas I. let his impatience drive him into the unhappy Crimean war; thereafter England had the great word on the Bosphorus. Now only one-and-twenty years have elapsed since the Congress of Berlin, and the Eastern question shows a physiognomy altered from the ground up. Upon the "sick man" a wonder-doctor has given astonishing proofs of his art; this wonder-doctor is Germany. At the same time, however, the centre of gravity of the so-called Eastern question has been shifted quite elsewhere. In the Balkans one seeks it and finds it no more. The Balkan peoples have, since they were thrown upon their own independent commonwealths, ceased to be "interesting." While they were still unhappy Rayahs, Christian Europe felt the obligation to take their part against the "unspeakable Turk"; now there is no longer any occasion for that, and it is only a question of keeping them quiet. Turkey, on the other hand, has been drawn, half unwillingly, into world policy, and that by Germany, which she — if the expression be permitted — passively assists. Germany has become an Oriental Power, and the centre of gravity of the Eastern question has been transferred across the Bosphorus into Asia. The Eastern question proper now lies between the coast of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf.

Scarcely a day now passes on which there is not talk in English or Russian papers of Bender-Abbas, the port on the Persian Gulf. Has Russia, they ask in London, secured for herself at Teheran the acquisition of this port? And if so, what has England to do in order to avert this threat to her Indian possessions from the seaward side? In England they love the old methods; formerly, so long as the Eastern question was an essentially European one, they always recommended the separation of the Austrian and the Russian spheres of interest. Now they cling to the thought that such a separation of the spheres of interest might take place in Persia: northern Persia for Russia, southern Persia for England. Beside all this, however, Germany pushes quietly forward, and has to all appearance taken France in tow. From Haidar Pasha the Anatolian railways, built with German money and under German guarantee, take their start; and since it lies in the nature of things that they cannot remain blind lines, their gradual continuation through the land of the Euphrates and the Tigris to the Persian Gulf follows of itself as a future necessity. Territorial gain is not thought of in the matter; but nowadays capital which serves strong national impulses and is supported by the backing of a great national power has a prodigious recruiting force, a far greater one than cannon and bayonets. It is not at all improbable that Herr Siemens, the director of the Deutsche Bank, will bring his railway from the Levantine littoral to the Persian Gulf to completion sooner than Mr. Cecil Rhodes his from Cape Town to Cairo. And for the world's commerce, for the great exchange between the Occident and the farthest Orient, the opening up of Asiatic Turkey and of Persia is in truth far more significant and more full of promise than the project of the Rhodesian, towards which Germany stands mistrustful and wary.

Beyond doubt this entry of Germany into the ranks of the Oriental Powers, and indeed into the foremost rank, is one of the most remarkable historical facts of the last half-century. If only because it pushes far off the danger of the disputed Turkish succession. The Sultan is no longer the "sick