Die Welt · Vol. IV, No. 13 · 30 March 1900
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Page 6. — "Die Welt" — No. 13.

The Amnesty.

By Emil Leimdörfer.

A mighty popular convulsion had stirred up the depths of the French nation. Its echo still trembled through every heart when the Government resolved, in order to bring about a general pacification at a single stroke, to lay before the two Chambers a bill by which all the trials connected with the Dreyfus affair should be swept out of the world, and the parties concerned referred, with any claims for compensation, to the civil courts. For the examination of the law a commission was appointed by the Senate, which began its labours a few days ago. To this commission those most nearly concerned, Dreyfus, Zola, Picquart and Reinach, addressed themselves in open letters. They set forth the grounds which determined them to come forward against the Government's plan. The three last in particular demanded to be allowed to explain more fully by word of mouth why they abhorred the amnesty. Their wish was granted, not, as it seems, to the pleasure of the Government. Picquart, in his exposition, compared the working of the friends of Dreyfus with the labour of the husbandman who sinks the winter corn into the ground, hoping that under the warm breath of spring the glorious seed will spring up. But a single grain of doubt was sown in the heart of the French people, and the doubt grew like the Fama of Virgil. Slowly only, wrestling hard against the disfavour of the times and the malice of men, does the truth come forth from it. As the tender seed must be shielded from the breath of frost, so must the truth be shielded from the amnesty, which would mercilessly destroy the laborious work.

We might content ourselves with letting the simple words in which Dreyfus defends himself against the amnesty work by their own force. The statements of Zola and the rest would, by their clearness and incontestable correctness, convince every unprejudiced man. But the poet Zola and the soldier Picquart grasped indeed the moral substance of the question and lent it the right words; Reinach found the right form for the political kernel; the juristic essence, however, was discovered by another. This time wisdom came to us from the fool. Quesnay de Beaurepaire performed his best piece of knavery when, in an article in the "Echo de Paris," he prated about the amnesty and hit upon the happy phrase of the "preventive amnesty." In our view he has therewith brought out the innermost part of the law and exhibited its bad logic in its full nakedness. Amnesty can be granted only to the condemned. Here we have to do with people who have perhaps made themselves guilty of the crime with which they are charged. But some of them have not so much as stood before the ordinary judge; against the others the condemning sentence has not yet acquired legal force. To this day Zola and his fellows must be held free and unpunished. For what, then, will one, or can one, bestow amnesty upon them? But we go further, and conclude that the law before us has a significance of principle, a significance perhaps not so much as suspected by its authors. The amnesty withdraws the guilty from the ordinary judge and pardons crimes which, according to the letter and the sense of the law, may not yet be regarded as committed. With this dangerous step the executive power enters the sphere of the judicial, hinders the regular course of justice, and arrogates to itself the first word. There we have that confusing and destructive interplay of executive and judicial power from which the modern State had believed itself escaped since the days of the French Revolution. These, in a few strokes, are the legal grounds against the amnesty.

The political objections to this law have been set forth by Josef Reinach with a distinctness which proves his practised historical and political eye. But for a moment let us give him no credence, and turn rather to that unequalled master of political thought whose repute and authority no one will be presumptuous enough to call in question. In the 42nd Letter of Junius, towards the end of it, we read: "A clear, unblemished character comprehends not only the integrity that will offer no injury, but the spirit that will endure none; and whether it belong to an individual or to a community, it is the foundation of peace, of independence, and of safety. Private credit is wealth; public honour is security." The French pride themselves on possessing the principles of the constitutional State in their full purity. Beyond doubt there belongs among these the inalienable right of every citizen to justice. Under the Amnesty Law it exists no longer for one group of citizens. What grounds are alleged for this extraordinary measure? Waldeck-Rousseau is not the man to cling to power at any price. As a patriot he must say to himself that the Intellectuals guard the true treasure of France; as an excellent advocate he must know that he is defending a position which under other circumstances would be lost. There can therefore be but one motive that has moved him to bring in this law: he fears the vengeance of the bourgeois whose material interests are injured if the World's Exhibition should fail. To the question upon what the law was founded, the Prime Minister replied: "The reasons of public order speak for it." Reinach has already shown, by the example of the Boulanger trial, that public order — in other words, the agreeable leisure of catching the glittering stream of gold in a peaceful bed — will not suffer thereby. Nor, he adds, will any man's conviction be altered by the compulsion of a law, but only by a wholly just judgment. One important circumstance, however, Reinach has not mentioned. Personal conviction will indeed work against the amnesty tenaciously, but in silence. The institution of the free press, on the contrary, will eloquently, with a loud voice, break that silence. The press cannot be forbidden to reflect the opinion of the people. The journals which have hitherto stood for the innocence of Dreyfus, and demanded that no mercy be exercised until all responsibilities had been established, will continue to do so; the others, which have designated the Intellect as the evil genius of France, will remain just as firm; meanwhile the Government will be compelled by its own Amnesty Law to look on impotently. For under the law all criminal proceedings connected with the Dreyfus affair, some already pending, some to become so in the future, are suppressed. The Intellectuals go unpunished if they assert the innocence of a man formally condemned; the united reactionaries may slander at their pleasure. The clamour continues, and the curse of such occasional laws is fulfilled — that they bring about the contrary of that which they aim at.

Upon the immorality of the Amnesty Law all the world is agreed. What an ignominy for Zola and Picquart to be thrown together with Mercier! Through Mercier's incapacity nearly 6000 Frenchmen perished in Madagascar without having seen the enemy — Mercier sits in the Senate and deliberates upon the highest goods of the nation; Zola spread the renown of the Fren-