Die Welt · Vol. V, No. 22 · 31 May 1901
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English · AI translation, checked against the German

Page 8 — "Die Welt" — No. 22

(continued from page 7)

…"formal discipline," as you call it, you have grievously transgressed. Your passionate letter is a valuable document of a scholar's soul startled out of its wonted repose. And yet — I do not wonder. Among the books which have appeared about the turn of the century, Chamberlain's book is indisputably one of the most full of intellect, but at the same time one of the most exciting. Problems of our time are here treated in their essential substance, in their — I should like to say — tragic interlacement, with so much inward sympathy, they are presented with such plastic force, that one would be tempted to range this work in a special category of a dramatic art-prose. And how near Chamberlain stands to the artist, that he confesses at the very outset.

But now to the problems. In the formulation of them, it is true — if for the present we still except that which is of most importance for us — there is not much that is new contained. Upon these things, when we ourselves bring them forward, we could hardly plume ourselves at all nowadays, so self-evident have they become to us; but in the handling of them by others we must give heed to them all the more, the larger we wish the host of intellectual combatants to be — and were they even our intellectual opponents. The ideas, in their indestructible kernel, are, like the works of eternal nature, "glorious as on the first day" also. Whether the triad of culture-powers now shortly to be canonised by history — Hellenism, Romanism, Judaism — whether culture at all is to signify a current but wretched formula or a real power in our life, that depends upon ourselves: upon the narrowed or the widened needs of our spirit, upon our inborn and our developed aptitudes, upon the moral earnestness, finally, with which we grasp the world, and above all the world of men. To natures to which these attributes belong in a positive sense, the past will always be of uncommon value; on the one hand as a regulative principle for the multiplicity of historical phenomena, on the other as inexhaustible material for the shaping and the reshaping of the present. Of that immeasurable something which in a space of thousands of years has uttered itself as human history, a great part has without doubt passed by without our ever having become conscious of it; nevertheless we suppose ourselves able to follow the general course of human events in clearly recognisable outlines, and persuade ourselves that in that which we hold fast we possess a real picture, a total picture, of the history of the world.

And why, indeed, should we not gladly acquiesce in this persuasion? The strongest motive of the historical way of regarding things is surely to be discerned — beside the pure impulse of research — in the endeavour to knit ever anew the living relation between the old and the new, to introduce the noble forms of the past into the present as well. If, in contemplating the peoples of antiquity, we direct our gaze chiefly upon those creations in which the abiding significance, the historically imperishable, expresses itself, it happens not least for this reason, that here there shines out to meet us an ideal of life which we should like to see realised for the peoples of the present also. The manifold forces which are at work among us assuredly bring forth much that is new; but when it is a question of shaping life as a whole, then we cannot and will not leave the past out of account, since with the one people and with the other it was so gloriously, so mightily shaped. The historical retrospect should work strengtheningly, should work encouragingly, for the ways which we would walk now and in the future. But now the question arises: does it work exclusively in that manner? Does the past not cast its deep shadows also down to our own days? Would not many a thing of that which is to come about proceed better and more successfully if the burden of age — I mean the burden of old views — did not press upon it? Here is the point where the leaf of history seems to turn to the disadvantage of human life. In any case there arises the necessity of setting up a supreme principle by which it might be determined how far the past works furtheringly, how far it works hinderingly, upon the course of all things human. From the mode of regarding the history of the peoples such a principle results of itself, even though it be not definitely formulated; for at the bottom of every presentation there rests a final conviction of the worth or the worthlessness of the historical.

What significance Chamberlain — to come to our particular case — accords to history appears plainly enough from the simple fact that this great work will furnish nothing more than the foundation for the work actually projected: "Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert." And what artistic enthusiasm historical greatness is able to arouse in him is attested by those two sections upon "Hellenische Kunst und Philosophie" and upon "Römisches Recht" — sections in which the intellectual character and the peculiar quality of the Hellenes and the Romans come out in brilliant fashion. The creative activity, especially of the Greeks, deserves this sustained loftiness of expression. But in spite of the glorification of these peoples Chamberlain says of their history that it too "worked as a hindrance to life, in that it has surrounded the free prospect into the purely human domain, in many directions, with a fence of a man's height." One cannot but be struck — here as everywhere else where Chamberlain touches the negative sides of men and of peoples — by how vehement, how harsh his judgment becomes, a trait which stands out disquietingly against Chamberlain's distinguished cast of mind and rises into the measureless when Chamberlain turns to the consideration of our people.

Now I should have arrived where you wished to have me. You desire that I write to you exclusively upon what I think of Chamberlain's judgment of Judaism — forgive me that I have not complied with you wholly, nor at once. It was a need with me, in a few general remarks at least, to indicate that tone which runs through the best pages of this book. Indeed I should have liked best to hold it fast as an echo of that time when I myself stood under the immediate effect of his words and pondered the fitting form of a worthy reply. My thoughts upon that — another time. But that a Chamberlain is not to be disposed of with "reviews" which describe him bluntly as an anti-Semite — against which, for the rest, he himself also protests — of that I am certain. I believe it is at last time that we learn to distinguish between a theoretical opponent of Judaism and its practical enemies.

A Treitschke, a Victor Hehn, a Paul de Lagarde we surely ought not to force into the same catchword which is the expression of vulgar and brutal instincts — although, God help us, it is at times, with the best will, difficult, difficult even for the psychologist, to determine the boundary where theory ceases and coarseness of feeling begins. In Chamberlain, however, there has arisen for Judaism an opponent to whom those men stand as mere forerunners; what with them was a beginning, an occasional sally, an episode, is here raised to a conscious method, to a system. But perhaps precisely therein lies also that which is consoling, that Chamberlain, everywhere there where he our people an-